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TRIUMPH OF THE SPACE COMMONS: ADDRESSING
THE IMPENDING SPACE DEBRIS CRISIS WITHOUT
AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY
JOSEPH KURT*
INTRODUCTION
Property damage resulting from floating flecks of paint generally
would not rise to the top of anyone’s list of environmental crises. And
reasonably so. But what if those flecks are floating by at 17,500 miles per
hour?1 And what if there are millions of pieces of similarly swift flotsam,
many thousands of which are much larger, heavier chunks of garbage?2
Further, what if the property at risk of destruction had huge implications
for weather forecasting, telecommunications, commerce, and national
security?3 And finally, what if the problem were on track to get worse—
much worse?4 Unfortunately, the above scenario is currently being played
out in Earth’s orbit, making the issue of ever-increasing space debris the
greatest environmental crisis unknown to most people.5
The cognoscenti, however, understand well that the many thou-
sands of pieces of man-made space debris orbiting the planet pose a
grave threat to the wide range of human endeavors in space.6 There is
* Juris Doctor candidate, William & Mary School of Law, 2016; B.A. Marquette Uni-
versity, 2000. I am deeply grateful for my friend Mario’s inspiring idea, for Professor
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Isaiah, and Clementine.
1 Sarah Laskow, The Economics of Space Junk, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www
.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/10/12/the-economics-space-junk/ARGKnCkIKMnzGyi63Hp
PHM/story.html [http://perma.cc/V7K9-USCT].
2 Mary Button, Note, Cleaning Up Space: The Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty as a
Model for Regulating Orbital Debris, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 539 (2013).
3 Scott J. Shackelford, Governing the Final Frontier: A Polycentric Approach to Managing
Space Weaponization and Debris, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 429, 430–32 (2014).
4 Laskow, supra note 1.
5 Id.
6 See generally Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Pro-
posal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
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also a broad consensus that the space debris problem necessitates a timely
international response.7 And if one peruses scholarly output on the sub-
ject, one might also assume that only a comprehensive and binding regu-
latory regime, in the form of an international treaty, can adequately deal
with this impending crisis.8 Calls for such regulation are grounded (explic-
itly or implicitly) on the assumption that the common ownership of space
by all nations is leading us towards a classic “tragedy of the commons,”
whereby a group of actors’ shortsightedness leads them to overuse a shared
resource to the point of ruining the resource for all.9
But despite the stream of proposals for some type of international
regulatory regime to address the issue, no measurable progress has been
made towards this end.10
This Note argues that the problem caused by proliferating orbital
debris can be effectively addressed without a comprehensive treaty. Part
I describes the growing crisis posed by space debris generally and also
explains why this crisis has the appearance of a tragedy of the commons
in the making. Part II describes the shortcomings of the current legal
regime governing space and suggests that, while the development of a
new legal regime is perhaps ideal, a treaty along these lines is unlikely
to materialize any time soon. Part III avers that an objective analysis
suggests that, even in the absence of a comprehensive treaty, spacefaring
nations are likely to avoid a tragedy of the commons. This analysis iden-
tifies underlying forces at play that provide incentives for spacefaring
nations to cooperate, describes promising technological developments
that will ameliorate the problem, and applies game theory as well as
scholarship analyzing the development of informal norms to the problem
of orbital debris. Finally, Part IV will suggest steps policy makers can
take to ensure that a tragedy of the commons in space is avoided.
L. 589 (2011).
7 Global Experts Agree Action Needed on Space Debris, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (Apr. 25,
2013), http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Debris/Global_experts_agree
_action_needed_on_space_debris [http://perma.cc/F4MJ-2W67].
8 Imburgia, supra note 6; Edgar M. Hollandsworth, THE SPACE DEBRIS CRISIS: TIME FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY 17 (Mar. 23, 2011) (unpublished strategy research project,
U.S. Army War College).
9 Brian Bremner & Peter Robison, Cleaning Up the Final Frontier, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 16,
2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-16/space-junk-in-earth-orbit-the
-cleanup-problem [http://perma.cc/8U77-7MAB].
10 Hollandsworth, supra note 8, at 17 (calling for a comprehensive treaty but acknowledg-
ing that one is “beyond the near-term horizon”).
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I. THE HAZARD OF SPACE DEBRIS
A. Defining and Quantifying Space Debris
As it is generally defined, space debris is a blanket term for the
remaining refuse of the more than 7,000 man-made objects launched into
orbit since the dawn of the space age.11 Space debris includes defunct
satellites, discharged rocket components, loose nuts and bolts, space tools
lost by astronauts, and even flecks of paint from spacecraft.12 In other
words, space debris includes every individual man-made scrap of mate-
rial in space that is not a functioning object.13 Some of this material falls
out of orbit within months or years, either falling back to Earth or burn-
ing up in the atmosphere.14 However, the vast majority of space debris
will remain in orbit for decades or even centuries.15
All told, there are more than half a million items of space debris in
lower earth orbit (“LEO”) and geosynchronous orbit (“GEO”), the two orbital
zones where humankind carries out almost all of its space activities.16
About 16,000 of these objects are larger than ten centimeters in diameter,
including nonfunctioning satellites.17 When objects of this size collide
with a functioning satellite, the likely result is the complete destruction of
the craft.18 The vast majority of objects in this class are relatively small,
yet are still highly destructive because of their incredible velocity.19 In addi-
tion to countless items smaller than one centimeter in diameter, which
can still cause significant damage to satellites and spacecraft, there are ap-
proximately 400,000 pieces of debris between one and ten centimeters in
diameter.20 These latter objects can cause severe damage to space vehicles,
even completely destroying them.21
11 See Bremner & Robison, supra note 9.
12 Krista Fuentes, Kathy Jones & David Wright, A Minefield in Earth Orbit: How Space
Debris is Spinning Out of Control, SCI. AM. (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican
.com/article/how-space-debris-spinning-out-of-control/ [http://perma.cc/H23K-HER9].
13 Imburgia, supra note 6, at 593–94.
14 Robert C. Bird, Procedural Challenges to Environmental Regulation of Space Debris,
40 AM. BUS. L.J. 635, 637 (2003).
15 Luke Punnakanta, Note, Space Torts: Applying Nuisance and Negligence to Orbital
Debris, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 163, 166 (2012).
16 Bird, supra note 14, at n.25. While the gravity of the space debris crisis differs between
LEO and GEO, this Note will largely forego distinguishing between the two. This Note’s
general economic analysis of the space debris problem is applicable to both orbital zones.
17 Fuentes, supra note 12.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
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B. The Costs Incurred by Space Debris
In 2012, the International Space Station (“ISS”) performed a tra-
jectory-changing engine-burn to avoid a small piece of debris.22 Such a
maneuver is costly,23 but necessary to avoid the kind of devastating punc-
ture that even a very small piece of debris can create.24 The increasing
frequency of such maneuvers is just one of the economic costs of the space
debris problem in its present state.25 For example, the initial launches of
numerous spacecraft have been delayed because of the presence of space
debris in the planned flight paths.26
Another cost incurred by the vast quantity of space debris in orbit
is adding protective shields to satellites that can minimize the damage from
very small pieces of debris.27 Not only is such a shield expensive in its own
right, it adds weight to the satellite and thus increases the amount of fuel
required—a cost increase that is born over the lifetime of the craft.28
As the amount of debris in space grows, the preventive measures
required to conduct activities in space will greatly increase the cost of
such operations.29 Of course, the price of replacing a satellite that is com-
pletely destroyed is the most expensive damage space debris can cause
to a particular craft, with a potential price tag in the hundreds of millions
of dollars.30 Over the long term, however, a much higher price will be borne
by all parties who have a stake in a usable orbit.
22 Space Station Dodges Super-fast Debris, UPI (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.upi.com/Science
_News/2012/01/13/Space-station-dodges-super-fast-debris/UPI-40381326448800/?spt=hs&or
=sn [http://perma.cc/NP8F-8LAP].
23 Press Release, European Commission, Avoiding Damage From Space Debris—Space
Surveillance and Tracking Proposal (Feb. 28, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release
_MEMO-13-149_en.htm [http://perma.cc/N4Q8-M63V] [hereinafter Press Release].
24 Space Station Dodges Super-fast Debris, supra note 22.
25 Press Release, supra note 23.
26 Imburgia, supra note 6, at 595.
27 Meghan R. Plantz, Orbital Debris: Out of Space, 40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 585, 598
(2012).
28 NASA Team Proposes to Use Laser to Track Orbital Debris (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www
.nasa.gov/content/goddard/nasa-team-proposes-to-use-laser-to-track-orbital-debris/#
.VHCloqVi6lI [http://perma.cc/PA43-VESQ] [hereinafter NASA Team Proposes].
29 Kate Kelland, The High Price of Avoiding Space Junk, Nov. 10, 2009, WASH. POST,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/06/AR20091
10603555.html [http://perma.cc/3VS4-SCLV].
30 Jared B. Taylor, Tragedy of the Space Commons: A Market Mechanism Solution to the
Space Debris Problem, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 253, 262 (2011).
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C. A Growing Problem: Satellite Collisions and the
Kessler Syndrome
Despite the high costs imposed by the large amounts of space debris
already in orbit, this problem might not rise to the level of a crisis were the
rate of space debris creation holding steadily. Unfortunately, the amount
of space debris orbiting the Earth is increasing at ever-faster rates.31 Two
relatively recent events bear the brunt of the blame.32
In 2007, China used an anti-satellite missile to destroy one of its
own weather satellites.33 That collision alone added over two thousand
bits of trackable debris to Earth’s orbit, and tens of thousands of smaller
bits of debris.34 Another devastating collision occurred in 2009 when an
active, privately owned satellite crossed paths with a defunct Russian
satellite.35 These two events alone are responsible for over a third of all
debris in Earth’s orbit.36
By creating innumerable new pieces of space debris, collisions
such as these in turn make further collisions more likely.37 The Kessler
Syndrome is the term given to this exponential growth in the amount of
space debris that would be the inevitable byproduct of a cascade of ever
more frequent collisions of space objects.38 The end result of the Kessler
Syndrome is catastrophe: the orbital zones surrounding the Earth would
be rendered unusable.39 At some point, a cascade of collisions will gather
enough momentum as to make this phenomenon irreversible.40 Scientists
cannot know how imminent such a tipping point is, but some believe it
could arrive within a decade or so if the problem is not mitigated.41
31 Fuentes, supra note 12.
32 Button, supra note 2, at 546.
33 Kelland, supra note 29.
34 Button, supra note 2, at 546.
35 Id.
36 Kelland, supra note 29.
37 Corrine Burns, Space junk apocalypse: just like Gravity?, THE GUARDIAN SCI. BLOG
(Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2013/nov/15/space-junk-apoca
lypse-gravity [http://perma.cc/G6HW-CTWC].
38 Brad Plumer, Space trash is a big problem. These economists have a solution, WASH.
POST WONKBLOG (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp
/2013/10/24/space-is-filling-up-with-garbage-heres-why-we-should-tax-it/ [http://perma.cc
/3F7V-8UMZ].
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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D. Space Debris: The Prototypical Tragedy of the Commons?
Many analysts suggest that the polluting of Earth’s orbital space,
potentially to a point of rendering it unusable, is a quintessential “trag-
edy of the commons.”42 It is easy to see why. A tragedy of the commons
occurs when actors overuse a commonly shared resource.43 Garret Hardin’s
classic example of farmers grazing cattle in a public pasture illustrates
the propensity of actors to make self-interested decisions about resource
allocation that ultimately destroy the common resource for all.44 This
result occurs because, paradoxically, actors make collectively foolish choices
by acting rationally in a series of instances.45
Take the example of the aforementioned farmers, who must re-
peatedly decide whether to bring one more cattle to graze in the public
pasture. In each of these instances, the nature of a cost-benefit analysis
with respect to a commonly owned resource will lead her to conclude that
she should introduce the additional animal.46 The reason is that the in-
dividual farmer bears only a small fraction of the cost of adding one more
animal because that cost (less usable pasture) is divided equally among
all who use the pasture.47 And, conversely, the same farmer receives all
of the benefit (one more well-fed cow).48
To frame the situation mathematically, an individual farmer’s
share of the cost can be quantified as the following fraction: “one” over
the number of farmers using the pasture (i.e., “one-tenth” if she is one of
ten farmers).49 The farmer, however, will receive a full unit of benefit—
i.e., “one.”50 Thus, the farmer’s calculation consists of weighing one (her
benefit) against, say, one-tenth (her cost, which in any case will be some
fraction less than one).51 Clearly, the instant cost-benefit analysis sug-
gests that she should bring one more cattle to pasture.52
42 Bremner & Robison, supra note 9.
43 Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 914 (2004) (ex-
plaining that tragedies of the commons occur when necessary care of common resources
is not undertaken).
44 Id.
45 Bremner & Robison, supra note 9.
46 Fennell, supra note 43, at 914.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Cf. id.
50 Cf. id.
51 Cf. id.
52 Cf. Fennell, supra note 43, at 914.
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And to translate this phenomenon into formal economic terms,
actors sharing a common pool resource have a tendency to overuse the
shared resource because they internalize all of the gain of their own ad-
ditional use while they externalize most of the cost of that same use.53
They will continue to make such “rational” calculations until they arrive
at a tragic result: the finite resource they shared will be depleted until
it is no longer available to any of them.54
E. Space: The Greatest Commons
International space law unambiguously establishes outer space
as a universal commons.55 The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (“OST”) de-
clares that space must be “free for exploration and use by all States” and
further prohibits the appropriation of space or celestial bodies by any
single nation.56 Subsequent treaties have further enshrined the principal
of space as a common resource owned by all of humankind.57
The upshot of this otherwise noble idea, however, is that space takes
on the character of Hardin’s cattle pasture: free access to space makes it
ripe for overuse.58 The vastness of space would make such overuse un-
likely were only spacecraft and satellites at issue, but ever-growing
amounts of space debris could render space as unusable as the overgrazed
pasture. Actors in space are faced with the same calculation as Hardin’s
farmer: the cost of their adding more debris to space is spread amongst
all users, but each actor reaps the full benefit of the use of space that re-
sults in the creation of more orbital debris.
II. THE NEGLIGIBLE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW,
PAST AND FUTURE
A. Overview of Current Space Law
Five widely adopted UN Treaties comprise the current legal regime
regarding outer space. OST is the foundation of all space law and was
53 Id.
54 See id.
55 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S.
205 [hereinafter OST], available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E
.pdf [http://perma .cc/Z7VN-TSNF].
56 Id.
57 Taylor, supra note 30, at 259–60.
58 Id. at 245–55.
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followed by separate agreements treating the rescue of astronauts, liability
for damage caused by space objects, the registration of objects in space,
and activities on the moon.59
Unfortunately, there is widespread agreement that these treaties
are wholly inadequate to handle the space debris crisis.60 For one thing,
these treaties make no mention of “space debris,” only “space objects.”61
It is not at all clear whether the latter term encompasses the former.62
And though the OST prohibits the “harmful contamination” of space, this
term’s definition is similarly murky.63 The Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (“Liability Convention”)
might seem to disincentivise the creation of damage-causing debris.64
However, the uncertainty over whether “space debris” is covered by the
treaty, coupled with the difficulty of proving fault for the purpose of at-
taching liability, renders the Liability Convention unlikely to alter the
behaviors of the actors at issue.65
In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Space
Debris Mitigation Guidelines (“Mitigation Guidelines”) of the Committee
on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”).66 These guidelines are cer-
tainly valuable as a set of “best practices,” but they are completely volun-
tary and not enforceable.67 While NASA and the European Space Agency
have adopted the Mitigation Guidelines, China’s 2007 ASAT test was a
blatant violation of similarly voluntary protocols already in place.68 The
spacefaring community needs greater reassurance that all actors will com-
ply with these protocols.
B. Calls for a Comprehensive Treaty to Address the Problem of
Space Debris
Scientists have long been concerned about the issue of space debris,
with COPUOS having begun to address the issue of space debris as far
59 Shackelford, supra note 3, at 448–49.
60 See generally Imburgia, supra note 6, at 593; Button, supra note 2.
61 Imburgia, supra note 6, at 615.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 614–15.
64 Id. at 617–18.
65 Id.
66 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of
the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2010) [hereinafter Mitigation Guidelines],
available at http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/Space%20Debris%20Mitigation%20
Guidelines_COPUOS.pdf [http://perma.cc/NL4U-DK9S].
67 Hollandsworth, supra note 8, at 18.
68 Id.
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back as 1993.69 And for more than two decades, commentators have been
calling for some type of centralized regime to deal with the growing prob-
lem of orbital debris.70 Some proposals are framed as market-based ap-
proaches, but contain numerous mandatory elements, thus requiring a
treaty to be universally enforceable.71
One common proposal is for a tax on space launches.72 The increase
in cost would deter some actors from adding more objects to the Earth’s
orbit, while the revenues collected would fund efforts to clean up space.73
There is no authority to impose such a tax, however, until nations grant
it through a treaty.74 Another creative approach suggests various ave-
nues by which tort law could be applied to the problem of space debris,
curing the defects of the Liability Convention.75
Other analysts expressly call for a comprehensive treaty, usually
suggesting a host of measures that should be included.76 One commenta-
tor posits the idea that the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty can serve as a model.77 Whether a treaty is explicitly
called for, or whether analysts focus on one particular mechanism (i.e.,
liability rules), the essence of all of these proposals is that they are bind-
ing, enforceable, and near universal.78 The idea that voluntary coopera-
tion is sufficient is generally dismissed.79
C. A Comprehensive Treaty in the Near Term Is Unlikely
The most recent convention dealing with activities in outer space,
the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, was drafted in 1979.80 There has been no follow-up
69 Imburgia, supra note 6, at 620.
70 See generally Lawrence D. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Debris: Combin-
ing International Regulatory and Liability Regimes, 15 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51
(Dec. 1, 1992).
71 Id. at 68–70.
72 Plumer, supra note 38.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See generally Punnakanta, supra note 15.
76 See generally Imburgia, supra note 6, at 593; Hollandsworth, supra note 8.
77 See generally Button, supra note 2.
78 For many of these proposals, this binding and universal nature is necessarily implied.
79 Thierry Senechal, Orbital Debris: Drafting, Negotiating, Implementing a Convention
62–63 (June 2007) (unpublished M.B.A. Thesis, M.I.T. Sloan School of Management),
available at http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/Orbital%20Debris%20Convention%20Thierry
%20Senechal%2011%20May%202007.pdf [http://perma.cc/JTK9-N5YP].
80 Id. at 55.
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convention in three and a half decades, despite the existence of many im-
portant and unresolved issues regarding the use of space.81 Many treaty
advocates have themselves adeptly described the substantial obstacles
that likely explain this lack of action.82
Some of the difficulties apply generally to forming international
conventions and include procedural issues such as which parties will draft
the treaty, methods of implementation, and monitoring and compliance
measures.83 Determining the scope of the issues to be covered poses par-
ticularly thorny questions in the context of orbital debris.84 Will the treaty
merely prescribe mitigation protocols?85 Or will it also impose liability
rules?86 Broadening the scope of issues may provide for a more complete
redress of the problem, but also implicates national security concerns,
the ability of space programs to operate effectively, and barriers to entry
by nations hoping to become active in space.87
Perhaps, in theory, these obstacles can be overcome. But interest-
ingly, even advocates of a comprehensive treaty seem to acknowledge
that efforts towards achieving such a pact are, for the foreseeable future,
moribund.88
III. REASONS FOR HOPE: WHY INTERNATIONAL ACTORS WILL
AVOID A TRAGEDY OF THE SPACE COMMONS WITHOUT A
COMPREHENSIVE TREATY
A binding international regime—i.e., a comprehensive treaty—
governing space debris might well be the most prudent international re-
sponse to the issue.89 But for all the reasons discussed above, anything
approaching a comprehensive agreement is nowhere in sight.90 If the need
81 Shackelford, supra note 3, at 500–01.
82 See Senechal, supra note 79, at 56–58.
83 Id. at 56.
84 Id. at 57.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Hollandsworth, supra note 8, at 22–23. This essay touches lightly on the concerns of
nations with nascent space programs who have not contributed to the space debris problem
at all, and who are unlikely to agree to be bound by the same rules as China, Russia, and the
U.S., who have almost exclusively caused the problem.
88 Id. at 17.
89 See generally Imburgia, supra note 6.
90 Plumer, supra note 38.
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for such a regime is as dire as many commentators suggest,91 perhaps
panic is in order.
However, this Part argues that in addition to the significant ob-
stacles to achieving a comprehensive treaty to deal with space debris, there
is perhaps an even more compelling reason why there has been almost
no progress in this direction: the space debris problem can be effectively
addressed without a binding treaty.
This claim flies in the face of common underlying assumptions
about solving tragedies of the commons.92 Nevertheless, Part III of this
Note will examine the space debris problem through three (overlapping)
lenses that each suggest that nations with interests in space will cooper-
ate to avoid a catastrophe in Earth’s orbit. Section A will demonstrate
that realistic solutions to the problem are entirely feasible—and on the
horizon. Section B, using the issue of global climate change as a point of
comparison, will argue that political cooperation can be achieved without
the force of international law. And Section C, informed by the practical
and political considerations of the first two sections, will apply economic
theories that also suggest that future international cooperation is highly
likely to resolve the issue of space debris.
A. Practical Considerations: Feasible Solutions to the Space Debris
Problem Are on Their Way
One key question in assessing whether an international treaty is
a requisite for solving the space debris problem is just how difficult it will
be to fashion a remedy. The more complex and costly are feasible solu-
tions, the more likely it is that a comprehensive regime is necessary to
bind the various actors together.93
A good place to begin is to determine just how imminent is the onset
of the cascade of exponentially more frequent debris-creating collisions,
known as the Kessler Syndrome.94 To be certain, no one can be sure—this
phenomenon being subject to highly complex probabilities.95 Indeed,
experts’ estimates of when such a cascade will become irreversible vary
91 See generally Imburgia, supra note 6.
92 Katherine Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bi-
drectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 681 (2010).
93 See infra Part III.C.
94 Burns, supra note 37.
95 Id. Donald Kessler’s original insight about space debris stemmed from his application
of algorithms he had earlier performed regarding meteorite collisions. Id.
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widely.96 The National Research Council produced a report in 2011 that
suggested that “space might be just 10 or 20 years away from severe
problems.”97 In fact, the cascading effect has already begun, albeit at a
modest pace.98 However, Donald Kessler, who first described the epony-
mous effect in 1978, has significantly recalibrated his own outlook over
the years.99 Originally, Kessler predicted that catastrophe would result
by the year 2000.100 That date long passed, Kessler now speaks of a
century-long process that “we have time to deal with.”101
Nevertheless, few would disagree with Cristophe Bonnal of the
Centre National d’Études Spatiales (“CNES”), the French space agency,
who says that it is “not yet clear” how much time we have to act.102 None
of this is to say that interested parties should not act with great dispatch
to address the space debris problem. Even if catastrophe is not on the im-
mediate horizon—as some have suggested—Heiner Klinkrad, the Euro-
pean Space Agency’s leading authority on space debris points out that
“[t]he longer you wait, the more difficult and far more expensive” any so-
lution will be.103
The additional slack in plausible timelines is cause for optimism
when one considers the progress being made towards remediating the prob-
lem of space debris. Such remediation entails a three-pronged approach:
preventive measures to reduce the creation of new debris,104 space debris
tracking technologies,105 and active debris removal (“ADR”).106
In an effort to address the first prong, the United Nations General
Assembly in 2007 endorsed the COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guide-
lines.107 The recommended measures include design changes which would
96 Jonathan Amos, ‘Urgent Need’ to Remove Space Debris, BBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2013), http://
www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-22299403?print=true [http://perma.cc/Z6FF-CVCC];
Maria Sheahan, Space Junk Needs to be Removed from Earth’s Orbit, Says ESA, REUTERS
(Apr. 25, 2013) http://www.thesudburystar.com/2013/04/25/space-junk-needs-to-be-removed
-from-earths-orbit-says-esa [http://perma.cc/2CSZ-GYMC].
97 Plumer, supra note 38.
98 Burns, supra note 37.
99 Id.
100 Plumer, supra note 38.
101 Burns, supra note 37.
102 Amos, supra note 96.
103 Sheahan, supra note 96.
104 See generally Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 66.
105 NASA Team Proposes, supra note 28.
106 Orbital Debris Remediation, NASA, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/Remediation/reme
diation.html [http://perma.cc/T4UT-688P].
107 Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 66.
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avoid the previously common practice of releasing debris during standard
operations, refraining from intentional destruction of space objects, and
limiting the risk of collisions through avoidance maneuvers and delaying
launch times.108 As the COPUOS document points out, many of these
practices had already been adopted by spacefaring nations.109
Compliance with the COPUOS Mitigation Guidelines is voluntary
and has not been universal;110 however, many nations do take steps beyond
those called for in the Mitigation Guidelines, recognizing the importance
of redressing the issue.111 That said, even if no nation ever again launched
a single object into outer space, the operation of the Kessler Syndrome
would ensure that, over time, continuing collisions amongst already pres-
ent objects would result in Earth’s orbit being rendered unusable.112
Improvements in space debris tracking technology are another
partial solution that promises to help actors avoid collisions by identify-
ing orbital debris in the path of satellites or spacecraft.113 There are limits
on the effectiveness of such tracking, however, including the inability of
some optical systems to track objects at night.114 Moreover, commonly em-
ployed systems cannot continually track objects smaller than thirty centi-
meters in diameter.115 New systems are being developed, however, that
will use lasers that can track the location of objects as small as a softball—
sometimes to within one meter.116 Such technology is still at the planning
stage for NASA,117 but Lockheed Martin is teaming up with an Australian-
based company on a laser-tracking project already in the works.118 An-
other promising development comes from scientists at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, who are working on soccer-ball-sized robots
108 See generally id.
109 Id. at iv.
110 Hollandsworth, supra note 8, at 18.
111 Zhoa Lei, China aids in cutting down space debris, CHINA DAILY EUR. ED. (May 13, 2014).
112 Orbital Debris Remediation, supra note 106.
113 Electro Optic Systems Holdings Limited (ASX:EOS) To Build The First Automated
Space Debris Tracker In The World, ABN NEWSWIRE (July 10, 2010), http://www.abnnews
wire.net/press/en/63337/Electro_Optic_Systems_Holds_Limited_To_Build_The_First
_Automated_Space_Debris_Tracker_In_The_World.html [http://perma.cc/33EN-FACN].
114 NASA Team Proposes, supra note 28.
115 Fuentes, supra note 12.
116 NASA Team Proposes, supra note 28.
117 Id.
118 Ben Geier, Lockheed Martin Wants to Be a Space Janitor, FORTUNE (Aug. 26, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/08/26/lockheed-martin-wants-to-be-a-space-janitor/ [http://perma
.cc/AR6H-324U].
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designed to travel alongside the ISS, investigating potentially harmful
space debris along the way.119
But while tracking space debris can help avoid specific accidents,
and thus slow the machinations of the Kessler Syndrome, only ADR can
stabilize the space environment.120
Fortunately, the targets for ADR that scientists believe will allow
us to forestall an irreversible cascade of collisions are relatively modest.121
The most common estimate is that removing five to ten large pieces of
debris per year is enough to keep the Kessler Syndrome at bay.122 And
even more encouraging is that a broad array of national and private actors
are exploring a plethora of ADR methods.123 For example, the Japanese
hope to deploy, by 2019, a magnetic net that will draw pieces of space
debris down to the Earth’s atmosphere, where they will burn up.124 Such
use of the atmosphere to incinerate debris is a common element of many
ADR strategies, whether they employ nets, harpoons, tentacles, or ion
thrusters to impact the debris.125 Meanwhile, a German Space Agency pro-
gram is developing the means to robotically capture satellites.126 Other
solutions include using enormous puffs of air, static electricity, or lasers
to throw objects out of orbit.127
Obviously, such projects carry a hefty price tag, but funding is com-
ing in from a variety of sources.128 A laser-based project being developed
by Australian National University, for example, received $20 million from
the Australian government and an additional $130 million from NASA
and other international public and private actors.129 But even these sums
119 Paul Marks, ‘Soccer-ball’ robots to patrol space for deadly junk, NEW SCIENTIST (Sept. 3,
2014), available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22329854-300-soccer-ball-robots
-to-patrol-space-for-deadly-junk/ [http://perma.cc/CL66-K5K6].
120 Leonard David, ‘Sling-Sat’ Space Junk System Promises Low-Cost Removal Of Orbital
Debris, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/04/sling
-sat-space-junk-orbital-debris_n_2805127.html [http://perma.cc/RWU2-XEAS].
121 Sheahan, supra note 96. While experts suggest these targets will help head off ca-
tastrophe—the central concern of this Note—they will by no means completely resolve
the space debris problem.
122 Amos, supra note 96.
123 Id.
124 Geier, supra note 118.
125 Amos, supra note 96.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See Throwing Money Into Space, ECONOMIST (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.economist
.com/blogs/babbage/2012/10/financing-space-start-ups [http://perma.cc/8Q48-FFJH].
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are dwarfed by the $2 billion that Russia’s leading space corporation,
Energia, is investing in a nuclear-powered pod that it hopes to deploy by
2023.130 This pod will fly around space for fifteen years, knocking debris
out of the atmosphere using an ion drive.131
That substantial investments in ADR technologies have seemingly
put us on the cusp of possessing the technology to stabilize the space
environment significantly undermines claims that incentives to solve the
orbital debris problem are lacking because of its nature as a “tragedy of
the commons”.132 Successful implementation of a solution is still years
away—and can’t be presumed. But taken together with the fact that we
likely have a decades-long window to redress the problem,133 Col. Joseph
Imburgia’s 2011 warning that “a binding international agreement is needed
to provide stability and order . . . and to preserve mankind’s access to and
through space” looks less and less prescient.134
B. The Political Sphere: Efforts to Mitigate Global Climate
Change as a Model of Cooperation
Prior to President Barack Obama’s visit to China in the latter part
of 2014, expectations for meaningful diplomatic achievements were low.135
Thus, the announcement that China and the United States were agreeing
to a major climate change accord made huge waves in the global press.136
Under the agreement, the United States is pledging to further reduce its
greenhouse gas emissions by 2025, while China is aiming to cap its growing
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/health-science/anu-taking-aim-at-space-junk
/story-e6frg8y6-1226848446376 [http://perma.cc/7T5C-SM9K].
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2010), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-11/russia-invests-2-billion-clean-space
-debris [http://perma.cc/8ZZ8-R2X5].
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133 Burns, supra note 37.
134 Imburgia, supra note 6, at 634.
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Trade, MCCLATCHYDC (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/11/12/246595
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TELEGRAPH (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange
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[http://perma.cc/EY2C-Y9PY].
320 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 40:305
emissions by 2030.137 The International Energy Agency called the agree-
ment “a giant leap for mankind.”138
Such an accord might seem far removed from the issue of space
debris, but the manner in which the nations of the world address the cli-
mate change crisis actually has significant implications for assessing
whether similar international cooperation is likely regarding space de-
bris.139 The international community’s response to climate change is a par-
ticularly apt analogue to the space debris crisis because climate change is
also seen as a classic tragedy of the commons.140 It is easy to see why.
The Earth’s atmosphere, like outer space, is a finite resource com-
monly owned by all nations.141 Individual actors—here, defined as entire
nations—reap the entire benefit that comes from emitting greenhouse
gases.142 The costs, however, of such emissions, are spread out amongst
all nations.143 Without regulations, rationally thinking nations seem to
lack the incentives to cut back on emissions.144 Hence, many believe that
only a binding treaty that caps emissions can avert a climate crisis.145
Recent events, however, suggest this isn’t necessarily so.
It must first be acknowledged that any argument that climate
change is a hopeful model is subject to skepticism for good reason—
namely the international community’s manifest failure to sufficiently
redress the problem.146 The inadequacy of previous mitigation efforts is
illustrated by the fact that, at the current rate of emissions, the Earth’s
temperature is predicted to rise between 3 to 8 degrees Celsius—with
catastrophic results.147 Climate scientists roundly proclaim that current
pledges to reduce emissions are not enough to redress the problem.148
137 David Biello, Everything You Need to Know about the U.S.-China Climate Change Agree-
ment, SCI. AM. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/everything-you
-need-to-know-about-the-u-s-china-climate-change-agreement/ [http://perma.cc/X6VT-662T].
138 Gosden, supra note 136.
139 Compare id. with Button, supra note 2.
140 Trisolini, supra note 92, at 681.
141 Richard N. Cooper, The Endangered Atmosphere: Preserving a Global Commons, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (July–Aug. 1997) (book review).
142 See Trisolini, supra note 92, at 681.
143 Robert N. Stavins, Climate Realities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2014, at SR6.
144 Trisolini, supra note 92, at 681.
145 David Roberts, Is there any hope for international climate talks?, GRIST (Sept. 30,
2012), http://grist.org/climate-energy/is-there-any-hope-for-international-climate-talks/
[http://perma.cc/C5Z2-X3R6].
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That troubling fact aside, this Note argues that climate change ef-
forts underway are actually a promising analog for space debris mitigation
for two reasons. The first is that, though efforts to date are insufficient,
there has been substantial progress made on the issue—and without any
binding international regime.149 For example, in July 2015, China followed
up on its 2014 pledge to curb emissions with a detailed plan submitted
in anticipation of the Paris climate change conference to be held at the
end of the year.150 On the very same day, the United States and Brazil
announced ambitious commitments to increase the percentage of each
nation’s energy production coming from renewable sources.151 Addition-
ally, Brazil pledged to restore more than 46,000 square miles of its rain-
forest, an undertaking that will help the planet remove significant amounts
of carbon dioxide from its atmosphere.152 These announcements built the
political momentum in the months leading up to the Paris conference. It is
important to note, however, that each nation made these commitments
voluntarily—and without the pressure of an already existing treaty.153
A second important reason for optimism makes that progress partic-
ularly impressive: the political and economic challenges presented by cli-
mate change seem far more intractable than those presented by the issue
of space debris.154 As with the issue of space debris, countries do not equally
share the blame for causing the planet to warm.155 But balancing the equi-
ties with respect to global warming is profoundly vexing. For instance,
just how much economic pain should nations like China (the world’s leading
emitter of greenhouse gases) and India be required to endure, especially
considering that so many Western nations have already reaped almost
two centuries of benefits from their unchecked burning of fossil fuels?156
In the United States, added to the potential economic costs of ad-
dressing climate change is the fact that a large percentage of the Ameri-
can populace simply does not believe that human beings are responsible
for the steady rise in the Earth’s temperature.157 Fortunately, denial of
149 Roberts, supra note 145.
150 Chris Mooney & Steven Mufson, In a Major Moment for Climate Policy, China, Brazil,
and the U.S. All Announce New Commitments, WASH. POST, June 30, 2015, at A6.
151 Id.
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153 Cf. id.
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the problem is not an obstacle to stabilizing the amount of debris in space.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that, in the midst of a fraught political atmo-
sphere, President Obama has been able to advance U.S. efforts to combat
climate change on a number of fronts.158
While the global community will continue to grapple with climate
change for some time, the substantial cooperation that is emerging on the
issue bodes well for the ability of spacefaring nations to handle a diffi-
cult, but undeniably more straightforward problem.
C. Rethinking Theory: Economic Models Point to International
Cooperation Even Without a Binding Treaty
The progress already being made on the space debris problem and
on the analogous problem of climate change is cause for optimism. If the
economic theories many commentators rely upon are correct, this should
come as quite a shock.159 However, a reexamination of common assump-
tions about how economic theory applies to the space debris problem
removes any cause for surprise and, in fact, is one more cause for opti-
mism that the tragedy of the commons can be avoided in orbital space.
1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Tragedies of the commons are often conceived of as “prisoner’s
dilemmas,” a concept arising out of game theory.160 Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, both global warming and the space debris crisis have been labeled
as such.161 This is a pessimistic label that does not apply to these issues,
however.162
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The classic prisoner’s dilemma poses players (who need not be
prisoners) with a simple choice: “cooperate” or “defect.”163 As applied to
Hardin’s quintessential illustration of a tragedy of the commons, a player
“cooperates” by limiting the number of cattle she brings to pasture.164 On
the other hand, by deciding to bring more cattle to the pasture, a player
“defects.”165 Based upon the presumption that players are acting in their
rational self-interest, game theory posits that a prisoner’s dilemma will
result in both players defecting.166 In a situation where a common pool
resource is at risk of being overused, repeated defections among its users
will invariably lead to the destruction of the common pool resource.167
The underlying forces of the prisoner’s dilemma seem to be the
same as those identified by Hardin: rational players recognize that they
internalize all of the benefits of defection but externalize much of the
benefits of cooperation.168 Understanding that other self-interested play-
ers face the same calculus, each player will refuse to let other players bene-
fit from her own cooperation—a move that would simultaneously reduce
her own “payout.”169
The prisoner’s dilemma is commonly illustrated by a diagram con-
taining four cells, each of which describes a possible outcome of the
game.170 The first cell describes the respective payouts to Players A and
B if they both cooperate. Using hypothetical numeric values to represent
the payouts, the first cell might read, “(A)4, (B)4”—for a collective payout
of ‘8.’171 The second cell represents the outcome if Player A cooperates but
Player B defects, and might read “(A)0, (B)6.”172 The third cell represents
the inverse: Player A defects but Player B cooperates. This cell might
a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 69 THEORY & DECISION 219, 219 (2010), available at http://link
.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11238-008-9121-3#page-1 [http://perma.cc/ZCD4-JVPR].
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165 Id.
166 ELLICKSON, supra note 163, at 161.
167 See Prisoner’s Dilemma, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Aug. 29, 2014) http://plato
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read “(A)6, (B)0.”173 Finally the fourth cell, representing the outcome if
both players defect, might read, “(A)2, (B)2.”174
The setting of values here is arbitrary, of course, but the idea is
that a situation is only properly termed a “prisoner’s dilemma” if the
outcomes mirror those described above.175 The requisite principles are as
follows: (1) mutual cooperation (Cell 1) yields the greatest collective
payout, (2) mutual defection (Cell 4) yields the lowest collective payout,
and (3) each player gains the highest individual payout when she defects
while the other player cooperates (Cells 2 and 3).176
Clearly, if Player A is motivated solely by her own self interest,
she would prefer the outcome described in Cell 3, which contains her
highest payout—and which results from her own defection and Player B’s
cooperation.177 Short of that ideal outcome, however, one can also see that
both players would far prefer the results of mutual cooperation (each
realizing a payout of ‘4’) to the results of mutual defection (each realizing
a payout of ‘2’). Why then, does the prisoner’s dilemma result in the
lowest collective payout possible and individual payouts lower than those
that would accrue if both players cooperated?
A crucial criterion of the prisoner’s dilemma is that players make
their choices both instantaneously and independently.178 In other words,
there is no room for negotiation.179 In these circumstances, whether
Player A guesses that Player B will defect or cooperate, Player A knows
that her payout will be higher in either case if she defects herself.180 It
therefore appears that the only “rational” move is to defect.181 The insidi-
ous irony of the prisoner’s dilemma is that Player B is faced with the
identical scenario, so both will make choices leading to poor individual
and collective outcomes.182
173 Cf. id.
174 Cf. id.
175 See ELLICKSON, supra note 163, at 160.
176 See id.
177 And, of course, the same logic would cause a self-interested B to want the inverse
outcome of Cell 2.
178 Ostrom, supra note 160, at 7.
179 See id.
180 ELLICKSON, supra note 163, at 161. For example, if Player B cooperates, Player A
knows that her own defection will yield her a payout of 6, whereas her cooperation will
yield her only 4. If Player B defects, she will receive a payout of either 0 or 2—the higher
value if she defects.
181 This fact makes defection in a prisoner’s dilemma what game theorists refer to as the
“dominant” move. Id. at 159–60.
182 Id. at 159–61.
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If we apply the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma to the issue of
space debris, each nation will seemingly realize that its best outcome
would be to defect while other countries cooperate.183 Here, defection
could include refusing to take costly precautions to avoid increasing the
amount of debris in orbit and failing to subsidize the development of
ADR technologies.184 Because each nation will predict that other nations
will similarly see the value in defecting, each will decide that cooperation
is a fool’s errand.185 Or so the theory goes.
2. The Unlocked Cell: Other Limitations of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma
A careful analysis reveals that the problem of space debris is not,
in fact, a prisoner’s dilemma.186 Furthermore, by more accurately identi-
fying the payouts of cooperation-defection scenarios, it becomes clear that
each party’s rationality—a key premise of game theory—should actually
encourage its cooperation.
One glaring problem with labeling the space debris problem as a
prisoner’s dilemma is that the game assumes that the players do not
speak to each other while deciding whether or not to cooperate.187 With re-
spect to spacefaring nations and the issue of debris, no such condition is
imposed, of course.188 To the contrary, attempts to move towards a treaty
(though feeble), the development of UN protocols regarding space debris,
and international investments in removal technology demonstrate the
existence of robust communication amongst the principal actors.189
Even the possibility of communication between parties dramati-
cally alters the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma because it opens the
door to negotiation.190 If parties recognize that a mutually poor outcome is
more likely than their ideal outcomes,191 they each have every incentive
183 These opportunists are termed “free riders” and pose a significant problem to collective
action problems, discussed infra. Ostrom, supra note 160, at 8.
184 See Fennell, supra note 43, at 914–15 (explaining that commons fall prey not only to
overuse, but underinvestment).
185 See ELLICKSON, supra note 163, at 160–61.
186 See generally Cole & Grossman, supra note 162.
187 Ostrom, supra note 160, at 7.
188 Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 66. The COPUOS guidelines are one obvious ex-
ample of robust international discourse.
189 Id.; see discussion supra Part III.A.
190 Ostrom, supra note 160, at 12.
191 See supra Part III.C.1 (Cell 4 shows the mutually poor outcome. Ideal outcomes are
shown in Cells 2 and 3 for Players A and B, respectively).
326 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 40:305
to work towards a compromise that achieves an outcome in the middle
of these extremes.192 In other words, they will seek a compromise where,
by mutual cooperation, they attain the highest collective payout and, in
a common pool resource scenario, avoid resource depletion.193
Furthermore, a crucial limitation of the typical prisoner’s di-
lemma is that it fails to capture the nature of many tragedies of the
commons—those that risk the total destruction of the usefulness of a
vitally important shared resource.194 If parties are able to appreciate this
impending, and dramatic, change in payouts (i.e., foresee the tragic
outcome and roughly calculate its costs), their rational self-interest will
suggest a different course of action than otherwise expected.
Reframed in another way, in the short term, the dynamics of a
prisoner’s dilemma would indeed seem to suggest that each party’s “domi-
nant”195 move is to defect and take advantage of the other party’s coopera-
tion. However, if the players are aware of the impending destruction of the
commons and factor this into their decision-making, rational and self-
interested decision-making no longer resembles a prisoner’s dilemma.
This point can be illustrated by applying Hardin’s pasture hypo-
thetical to two farmers.196 Let us assume that the individual benefit of
adding an additional cow to the pasture is ‘5,’ and that the collective cost
of each additional cow is ‘6’—and thus ‘3’ for each player. The resulting
payouts can be described as follows: Cell 1, “(A)0, (B)0”; Cell 2, “(A)-3,
(B)2”; Cell 3, “(A)2, (B)-3”; and Cell 4, “(A)-1, (B)-1.” These outcomes meet
the criteria of a prisoner’s dilemma: the highest collective payout results
from cooperation (Cell 1), the lowest collective payout arises from mutual
defection (Cell 4), and the highest individual payouts result from one
player defecting while the other cooperates (Cells 2 and 3).197
The logic of the prisoner’s dilemma dictates that each player will
selfishly add another cow to the pasture.198 And if the anticipated payout
remains the same, they will continue to add cows in future iterations of
the game.199 But what if the players realize that at some uncertain point
192 Id. (represented by Cell 1).
193 See Cole, supra note 162, at 227.
194 Id. at 223–25.
195 ELLICKSON, supra note 163, at 159–60.
196 Obviously more than two actors are involved in the space debris problem, but this two-
person scenario simply and clearly illustrates a principle that applies to multiplayer games.
197 It should be noted that “payouts” can actually be “costs”—which are reflected in the
negative numbers. See Fennell, supra note 43, at 945.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 961 (averring that “[i]f a player’s perception of the payoffs changes, the game
changes”).
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in the near future the addition of more cows will utterly destroy the
pasture? Furthermore, what if the farmers depend entirely on the pas-
ture for their subsistence? If this is the case, the farmers will calculate
that they risk a payout scenario that looks gravely different than that
described above. The complete destruction of the pasture will result in
costs that far exceed the values in the cells above, perhaps ‘100’ collec-
tively—or ‘50’ to each farmer. Even if we generously assume that the
farmers were still able to realize the benefit of adding an additional cow
(‘5’) before the pasture’s destruction, the following payouts would result:
Cell 1, “(A)0, (B)0”; Cell 2, “(A)-50, (B)-45”; Cell 3, “(A)-45, (B)-50”; and
Cell 4, “(A)-45, (B)-45.”200
The values in the cells above reflect a stark potential outcome of a
tragedy of the commons: the only possible way to avoid a payout of colossal
costs is to mutually cooperate.201 A two-person prisoner’s dilemma game
cannot accurately describe the dynamic between numerous actors shar-
ing a common resource, where there is often a certain number of cooper-
ating players needed to stave off the destruction of the resource.202 What
the two-player hypothetical does capture accurately, however, is the way
that defecting players “roll the die”: they may receive a beneficial payout,
but they also risk catastrophe.203 As the tipping point for that abject
payout appears closer, rational actors will find ever-increasing incentive
to cooperate.
3. The Free-Rider Problem
Another vexing element of communal resource problems merits
attention. This is the problem of “free riders,” those who would defect and
reap the benefits of parties who choose to cooperate in avoiding the
tragedy of the commons.204 Aside from being morally galling, the exis-
tence of these opportunists certainly leads to less than optimal outcomes,
200 This payout scheme reflects the point where the addition of one more cow will cause
the destruction of the pasture. Therefore, the costs of such destruction are not doubled
by both players’ defection.
201 Mutual cooperation may result in a short-term cost, but presumably yields a large
benefit for a common property with value.
202 Prisoner’s Dilemma, supra note 167 (proposing an alternate payout matrix where mul-
tiple actors share a common resource at risk of overuse).
203 With regard to space debris, a large degree of uncertainty exists regarding the timing
of an irreversible cascading effect. Prisoner’s Dilemma also identifies the (potential) uncer-
tainty regarding the number of players whose cooperation is needed to avoid the tragedy
of the commons. Id.
204 Ostrom, supra note 160, at 8.
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which can only be achieved if everyone pitches in (or shows restraint,
depending on the nature of the problem).205 The big fear, however, is
that, perhaps even after cooperation has already begun, the presence of
free riders will put the group back on the path towards the tragedy of the
commons.206 Who in their right mind, after all, would choose to continue
receiving the “sucker’s payout” of cooperation while another takes full
advantage of his magnanimity?207 Actually, common sense suggests that
you and I might.
Imagine that you are in a sinking fishing boat with five other
people. You’re approaching the shore, but the only way you can make it
back to safety is if several of you bail out the water. You all have buckets,
so everyone gets to work. Everyone except Lazy Pete, that is. No doubt
you’ll all resent Lazy Pete’s inaction, but will you all follow his lead? Prob-
ably not if the stakes (here, your life) are high enough.208
This intuitive answer is, in fact, born out in Professor Elinor
Ostrom’s research.209 In experiments and field studies of collective action
problems, Ostrom and her colleagues did observe some free riders, but
found that more individuals cooperate than might be expected.210 Ulti-
mately, whether one will internalize extra costs where others reap un-
deserved benefits is just another facet of the cost-benefit analysis.211 The
higher the stakes are, the more unlikely it is that free riders will discour-
age the cooperation of others; and the less likely it is that actors will free
ride in the first place.
IV. THE PIVOT: FROM AVOIDING CATASTROPHE TOWARDS ACHIEVING
OPTIMAL OUTCOMES
Modern economic scholarship challenges the assumption that
solutions to common interest tragedies necessitate an external authority
imposing rules on resource users.212 And the facts on the ground amply
demonstrate that progress is being made toward a solution to the space
debris problem.213 But although alarmist calls for a treaty may be
205 Id.
206 See id.
207 See Fennell, supra note 43, at 945.
208 It is more efficient if everyone helps out, and so the results might be termed “sub-
optimal.” But the salient point is that the tragic result is avoided. Id. at 941.
209 Ostrom, supra note 160, at 10.
210 Id.
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212 Ostrom, supra note 160, at 5.
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overwrought, the progress being made should not lead U.S. policymakers
to rest on their laurels. The first section of Part IV explains why a sense
of urgency should still guide space debris mitigation efforts. Section B
summarizes economic theories that explain how to facilitate cooperation
amongst community members facing a common resource problem. Fi-
nally, Section C applies these theories regarding cooperation to the prob-
lem of orbital debris.
A. The Exigency Remains
With respect to some common resource problems, the prospect of
continued cooperation may be enough to suggest a successful resolution
to the issue. Say, for example, that the farmers from Hardin’s pasture
recognize the threat of overgrazing and, after some negotiation, agree to
slow the introduction of new cattle to sustainable levels. This would seem
to resolve the issue. As long as farmers abide by that agreement, they
will avoid the tragedy of the commons.
Achieving a more or less permanent solution to the space debris
problem is not as straightforward. The reason is that even as the space
debris problem is being redressed, the risk of space objects colliding
remains as long as there are uncontrolled objects whizzing around the
Earth’s atmosphere.214 With millions of such objects now in orbit, this
will indeed be the case for a very long time.215
Improved tracking capabilities, avoidance maneuvers, and (even-
tually) ADR technologies all work together to make such collisions less
likely. However, no remediation can remove the risk of accidents alto-
gether, and some collisions could have devastating effects: the destruc-
tion of even one large satellite could double the amount of space debris
in orbit.216 Of course, any such increase in the amount of debris in orbit
then renders other collisions more likely to occur.217 It is thus possible
that after a number of years making progress towards reaching a sus-
tainable level of debris, a stroke of bad luck could rapidly undo such
progress and unleash the dreaded Kessler Syndrome.218
That said, the risk of such an unwelcome series of events is no
cause for despair. If cooperative mitigation efforts continue, the “odds are
214 Cf. Fuentes, supra note 12.
215 Id.
216 Shackelford, supra note 3, at 495.
217 See Plumer, supra note 38.
218 See id.
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ever in our favor” that a tragedy of the space commons can be avoided.219
Considering the paramount importance of the space commons, it is in the
interest of spacefaring nations to act with haste to improve those odds.
The second reason for states to act with urgency is not uncon-
nected to the first. The longer we wait to solve the space debris problem,
the more expensive the solution becomes.220 For example, while experts
estimate that the removal from orbit of just five space objects per year
could stabilize the situation in Earth’s atmosphere, that number will
only increase with the introduction of more space debris.221 Therefore,
even if a large collision somehow does not set off a cascading chain of col-
lisions, it will certainly dramatically increase the cost of remediation.
B. Encouraging Cooperation
In his seminal work, Order Without Law, economist Robert
Ellickson described the way that cattle ranchers in Shasta County,
California, developed extrajudicial norms to govern liability for cattle
trespasses and to cooperate on fence building and maintenance.222 From
his observations of this cooperation amongst ranchers, Ellickson devel-
oped a hypothesis that has implications for effectively remediating the
space debris problem.223
Ellickson’s hypothesis is predictive: “members of a close-knit
group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the
aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with
one another.”224 This hypothesis is startlingly optimistic in two ways. First,
it avers that the group itself will develop these norms, removing the need
for an external authority (akin to a treaty) to impose a regulatory regime.225
Second, the hypothesis claims that the resulting norms will not
merely be workable, but that they will “maximize the aggregate wel-
fare.”226 Ellickson’s broad definition of “welfare” encompasses economic
benefits and other desired outcomes.227 In the context of space debris
219 See generally Suzanne Collins, THE HUNGER GAMES (Lionsgate 2012) (paraphrasing,
of course).
220 See Sheahan, supra note 96.
221 Amos, supra note 96.
222 See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 163.
223 Id. at 167.
224 Id. at 165.
225 See generally id.
226 Id. at 167.
227 Id. at 170.
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remediation, welfare maximization would include economically efficient
operational norms and the timely development of practicable debris re-
moval technologies.
Another term from Ellickson’s hypothesis deserves attention, for it
may seem that spacefaring nations are hardly a “close-knit community.”228
Ellickson’s definition of this term, however, belies its bucolic connotation.
For Ellickson’s purposes, close-knittedness is defined by the sharing of
both information and of informal power (such as that of applying sanctions)
and by the ongoing nature of relationships amongst members.229
Defined this way, the community of space faring nations would in-
deed seem to be “close-knit.”230 Certainly, there are ongoing iterations in
the “game” of spacefaring, and nations regularly employ what Ellickson
calls “self-help” remedies when other nations prove uncooperative.231 Fur-
ther, substantial information sharing is evident from the cooperative
efforts of COPUOS and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee.232
Nonetheless, whether or not a community is “close-knit” might not
always be amenable to a simple “yes” or “no” answer.233 Crucial differ-
ences between spacefaring nations and the Shasta County ranchers
make it impossible to assume similarly effective cooperation will result.
For one, while both “games” have multiple iterations, Ellickson was
studying norms that had developed over many decades.234 The cattle
grazing and fence-building norms also presumably evolved naturally over
time. With respect to space debris, the risks of catastrophic collisions add
a unique element of time pressure to norm formation.235
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Moreover, with respect to space debris, it may not be sufficient to
control norms with the same degree of effectiveness as that achieved by the
ranchers. This point is illustrated by the story of Frank Ellis, a latecomer
to the Sasha County ranching business.236 Ellis frequently flouted the
ranchers’ tacit rules, instigating numerous conflicts with his neighbors.237
The informal sanctions employed by ranchers, usually so effective, had
no effect on Ellis.238 Despite their troubles, life went on for the residents
of Shasta County—even if many were happy to see Ellis depart after
several years.239 As demonstrated by the destruction of the Chinese sat-
ellite, one rogue actor in the space arena is far more dangerous.240
C. From Predictive to Remedial: Using Theory to Achieve
Optimal Results
To whatever degree spacefaring nations constitute a “close-knit
community,” policymakers would be wise to proactively strengthen the
bonds amongst these international actors. Elinor Ostrom’s work, which
seems to build on Ellickson’s hypothesis, can serve as a starting point in
this endeavor.
Ostrom identifies several variables that together predict the likeli-
hood of cooperation amongst actors facing a collective action problem.241
Factors that point to cooperation include a common belief in the importance
of the resource, the possession of reliable information, shared past suc-
cesses, a desire among actors to be seen as trustworthy, and means of ap-
plying sanctions.242 These factors are highly consistent with—if not more
fleshed out than—Ellickson’s definition of a “close-knit” community.243
Ostrom views her work not merely as predictive, but as a road-
map to effectively address collective action problems.244 Ostrom advocates
a “polycentric” approach to solving problems of the global commons.245 As
opposed to a regime governed by a central authority, polycentric decision-
making occurs amongst diverse, smaller, and sometimes overlapping
236 ELLICKSON, supra note 163, at 33.
237 Id. at 33–39.
238 Id. Interestingly, gossip among neighbors was a sufficient sanction. Id.
239 Id. at 38–39.
240 Button, supra note 2, at 546.
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actors.246 The actors could be individual nations, regional groups, or
multinational organizations.247 Ostrom has, pertinently, applied this poly-
centric approach to another potential tragedy of the global commons—
climate change.248 And even more germane is Professor Scott Shackelford’s
recent assertion that a polycentric regime is emerging with respect to the
space commons.249
It seems likely that Ellickson would simply view polycentric re-
gimes as a unique, and complex, iteration of a “close-knit” community.250
That said, the question of how to strengthen the bonds of members of the
space faring community is an apt one.
Facilitating the sharing of information amongst spacefaring par-
ties would almost certainly be at the top of the list. Both Ellickson and
Ostrom emphasize the importance of the free flow of reliable information
between actors.251 It is, after all, the lack of information-sharing that is
a key reason why a true prisoner’s dilemma engenders noncooperation.252
Information regarding the threat posed by debris is particularly critical,
as it is paramount to avoid collisions—especially where advance notice
is possible.253
Obligatory sharing of information is also one of the most prominent
elements of Col. Imburgia’s proposals for a binding space debris treaty.254
In an article insisting upon the need for such a treaty, Imburgia calls for
a comprehensive registry of space objects, the dissemination of tracking
data, and cooperation in developing ADR technologies.255 For Imburgia,
the sharing of information is one of the primary goals of a centralized
(treaty) regime, whereas for Ellickson and Ostrom, information sharing
is a precondition of fostering cooperation in a non-centralized regime.256
Another aspect of cooperative communities, important to Ellickson
and Ostrom, deserves the close attention of policymakers: the sanctioning
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powers of community members.257 One can imagine the types of sanctions
that would adequately respond to modest transgressions, such as the
refusal to share data or the failure to follow a certain protocol that
prevents the formation of new space debris. Perhaps one nation might
answer these misbehaviors by withdrawing cooperation from a joint space
project or by refusing to award a coveted contract.258 But how would the
community respond to another deliberate act of destruction like the
ASAT test carried out by the Chinese in 2007?259 Nations have every
incentive not to perform such a reckless act, but the possibility that a
rogue actor might be tempted to such intransigence demands that other
nations have appropriate penalties at the ready. “Community members”
should place the development of potential at-the-ready sanctions towards
the top of their agendas.
CONCLUSION
The potential consequences of the space debris crisis could hardly
be more grave, implicating the fabric of both our daily lives and our na-
tional security apparatus. Recognizing these high stakes, and identifying
the problem of orbital debris as a tragedy of the commons, numerous com-
mentators have claimed that a comprehensive treaty to redress the issue
is imperative.
The lack of meaningful progress towards such a treaty is no call
for alarm, however. Economists are reevaluating assumptions regarding
common resource problems, resulting in a much more optimistic outlook
with respect to when actors will cooperate. While some find voluntary
cooperation on the issue of space debris counterintuitive, it really is com-
mon sense. The actors involved recognize clearly that shortsighted, self-
interested actions will lead to a terrible disaster that they could only regret.
The cooperation that is under way to solve this problem is consis-
tent with the analyses of economists like Robert Ellickson and Elinor
Ostrom. However, it is vital that policymakers not assume that progress
already made assures that catastrophe will be averted. Instead, they
should deliberately cultivate the preconditions that these economists
suggest facilitate cooperation.
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